Whatever it is that's been plaguing blogger since Wednesday, it's obviously affecting my page. I can update, but I get error messages and (as one can note by heading down to the bottom of the page) my counters aren't working.
(Just in case you're wondering why updates have been sparse lately)
Edit: and perhaps it was a poor time for sparse updating, considering the furor that the discussion with Musil has provoked on behalf of some people, including Musil himself. To be honest, the entire field of International Relations (I.R.) is like this in some respect, which is why rather disquieting insights into the nature of power and legitimacy, such as Machiavelli's and Hobbes' usually carry the day. (It's also the best argument I've seen against anarchism of any stripe, but especially the radical-individualist kind as opposed to the radical-democratic kind. Musil continues to mistake the one for the other, by the way.)
I'll respond in more depth later to the various charges, but I'd like to reiterate one point: an empirical observation is not a normative claim. In other words, describing things as they are doesn't necessarily imply that these are morally right, justifiable, or fair, or that methods don't and shouldn't exist to ameliorate the drawbacks of the situation as it exists. A naked man cannot kill a tiger, and any man that doesn't understand that will end up tiger spoor- but a tiger cannot hope to kill a group of armed men, and any man that remembers and applies that knowledge can live without fear.
Sunday, July 14, 2002
Friday, July 12, 2002
Robert Musil has written an unutterably goofy response to my points on the concept of sovereignty.
Why is it unutterably goofy? Well, for several key reasons:
1)He mixes up concepts of sovereignty and international law. Sovereignty predates international law and international bodies as they exist today, and the necessity of such treaties is due to the nature of the sovereignty of the nation-state. (or of any government- a tribal leader can be as sovereign as a president.) I wonder whether Musil even understand what the word "sovereign" means, and where a state derives its power from- the reason why I argued that "sovereignty exists" is because somebody has to, by definition, wield governmental power.
2) No, Robert, anarchists do not reject "all law"... they reject a state body, but most true Anarchists believe in radical democracy... government by consensus. In any case, he obviously missed why I cited anarchists- they are an example of a group of people who do not hold his "universal truths" to be "self-evident". No argument that reasonable people disagree with can be "self-evident". This is not some sort of radical PoMo argument (as Musil seems to imply)... it's simply an observation of reality as it exists. I can see how he'd make this mistake, though: anarchy is a tricky concept, and there's a difference between the concepts of anarchy-as-chaos and big "A" Anarchism.
3) He seems to think that I'm against the concept of human rights. Musil, nothing could be further from the truth, but rights don't exist in a vacuum. They are defined by society and protected by the state- that's one of the roles of the state that, if abrogated, can lead to the loss of its legitimacy, because the people will rebel against it. What those rights actually are varies from society to society and from state to state, of course, and other states are free to criticize if they feel that rights are not being adequately protected. (This is the foundation of the Marxian critique- they believe that economic equality is a human right, that liberal systems cannot provide it, and therefore should be overthrown. Even Marxists don't deny the idea of state sovereignty and the idea of legitimacy derived from the people, however).
Indeed, many of the "deals" I mentioned earlier have to do with states agreeing to certain ground rules in how they define and defend human rights in exchange for other goods (such as increased international prestige, increased popular support, or more tangible things like military aid and freer economic trade).
4) He tries to cite South Africa, yet it's a perfect example of the dealmaking I talked about. The UN boycotts were part of the deal that the U.N. members had made with each other to act collectively, and can easily be explained as "proxy" morality... it wasn't that the U.N. forbade South Africa from acting as it saw fit, but because it didn't believe that its members should encourage or aid South Africa in an act it found immoral by trading or associating with it (and therefore tacitly approving its behavior), it decided to require those members not to trade with South Africa. That wouldn't stop, say, Switzerland from trading with South Africa, and it certainly didn't affect South Africa's sovereignty within its own borders. South Africa ending Apartheid was, in the end, its own doing.
If Musil's argument were actually correct, the U.N. would have authorized forcible change in South Africa, and it knew that it had no authority to do so. (Nor did it in the informal traditions of the international system... one of the key precepts of that system is that what goes on within a state's own borders is its own business, although other nations are free to disassociate and/or condemn that state if they wish). He also attempts to argue that the U.N.'s exclusion of South Africa meant that South Africa wasn't legitimate. That, of course, wasn't true: it simply meant that the U.N. would not accept the membership of any country that engaged in Apartheid. Whether the language reflected that or not is immaterial- as I said earlier, legitimacy is derived from the subjects (or citizenry.) Nobody else gets to decide that, and that includes the U.N.
5) and finally, he does a little free-form ranting about how evil my position is. Ah, ad hominems. Musil, it isn't a normative statement, it's an empirical statement ("Ought implies Can"). I merely described how systems of power, sovereignty, and legitimacy work by definition- normative claims have nothing to do with empirical observation, and these concepts are hardly original to me: basis of modern international relations. (Yes, I tend towards a Neo-Realist analysis of I.R., mostly because the school of I.R. thought that Musil unknowingly advocates, Liberalism, failed so spectacularly with the League of Nations.) Normative questions only come into play when that state (and by extension that society) decide what they want to do with that power- and in some cases, they decide that liberal democracy is the safest, stablest, and most economically effective system, so they decide to switch to that system. (or social democracy, or the odd Asian free-economic-but-restrictive-social-systems such as those that exist in Singapore, or mixed monarchy/democracy systems such as the English one, or whatever.)
In the end, democracy shouldn't be defended because it is the only legitimate system... that's nonsense, and dangerous nonsense at that. It was that sort of blindness that hamstrung and eventually destroyed the League. Democracy should be defended because it does the jobs of the state best- protecting the rights that the society deems important (as well as helping the society to determine which rights it deems important... a more important question than it seems when you get into the question of human rights vs. property rights), defending the subjects (or citizenry) of the state, promoting economic growth, ensuring domestic tranquility and stability, and best reflecting the wishes of the society. This is why democracy can't be imposed, however, but must grow from the desires of the people themselves... because if they don't grant a democratic government legitimacy, Robert, it doesn't matter how much you rant: it isn't legitimate.
Why is it unutterably goofy? Well, for several key reasons:
1)He mixes up concepts of sovereignty and international law. Sovereignty predates international law and international bodies as they exist today, and the necessity of such treaties is due to the nature of the sovereignty of the nation-state. (or of any government- a tribal leader can be as sovereign as a president.) I wonder whether Musil even understand what the word "sovereign" means, and where a state derives its power from- the reason why I argued that "sovereignty exists" is because somebody has to, by definition, wield governmental power.
2) No, Robert, anarchists do not reject "all law"... they reject a state body, but most true Anarchists believe in radical democracy... government by consensus. In any case, he obviously missed why I cited anarchists- they are an example of a group of people who do not hold his "universal truths" to be "self-evident". No argument that reasonable people disagree with can be "self-evident". This is not some sort of radical PoMo argument (as Musil seems to imply)... it's simply an observation of reality as it exists. I can see how he'd make this mistake, though: anarchy is a tricky concept, and there's a difference between the concepts of anarchy-as-chaos and big "A" Anarchism.
3) He seems to think that I'm against the concept of human rights. Musil, nothing could be further from the truth, but rights don't exist in a vacuum. They are defined by society and protected by the state- that's one of the roles of the state that, if abrogated, can lead to the loss of its legitimacy, because the people will rebel against it. What those rights actually are varies from society to society and from state to state, of course, and other states are free to criticize if they feel that rights are not being adequately protected. (This is the foundation of the Marxian critique- they believe that economic equality is a human right, that liberal systems cannot provide it, and therefore should be overthrown. Even Marxists don't deny the idea of state sovereignty and the idea of legitimacy derived from the people, however).
Indeed, many of the "deals" I mentioned earlier have to do with states agreeing to certain ground rules in how they define and defend human rights in exchange for other goods (such as increased international prestige, increased popular support, or more tangible things like military aid and freer economic trade).
4) He tries to cite South Africa, yet it's a perfect example of the dealmaking I talked about. The UN boycotts were part of the deal that the U.N. members had made with each other to act collectively, and can easily be explained as "proxy" morality... it wasn't that the U.N. forbade South Africa from acting as it saw fit, but because it didn't believe that its members should encourage or aid South Africa in an act it found immoral by trading or associating with it (and therefore tacitly approving its behavior), it decided to require those members not to trade with South Africa. That wouldn't stop, say, Switzerland from trading with South Africa, and it certainly didn't affect South Africa's sovereignty within its own borders. South Africa ending Apartheid was, in the end, its own doing.
If Musil's argument were actually correct, the U.N. would have authorized forcible change in South Africa, and it knew that it had no authority to do so. (Nor did it in the informal traditions of the international system... one of the key precepts of that system is that what goes on within a state's own borders is its own business, although other nations are free to disassociate and/or condemn that state if they wish). He also attempts to argue that the U.N.'s exclusion of South Africa meant that South Africa wasn't legitimate. That, of course, wasn't true: it simply meant that the U.N. would not accept the membership of any country that engaged in Apartheid. Whether the language reflected that or not is immaterial- as I said earlier, legitimacy is derived from the subjects (or citizenry.) Nobody else gets to decide that, and that includes the U.N.
5) and finally, he does a little free-form ranting about how evil my position is. Ah, ad hominems. Musil, it isn't a normative statement, it's an empirical statement ("Ought implies Can"). I merely described how systems of power, sovereignty, and legitimacy work by definition- normative claims have nothing to do with empirical observation, and these concepts are hardly original to me: basis of modern international relations. (Yes, I tend towards a Neo-Realist analysis of I.R., mostly because the school of I.R. thought that Musil unknowingly advocates, Liberalism, failed so spectacularly with the League of Nations.) Normative questions only come into play when that state (and by extension that society) decide what they want to do with that power- and in some cases, they decide that liberal democracy is the safest, stablest, and most economically effective system, so they decide to switch to that system. (or social democracy, or the odd Asian free-economic-but-restrictive-social-systems such as those that exist in Singapore, or mixed monarchy/democracy systems such as the English one, or whatever.)
In the end, democracy shouldn't be defended because it is the only legitimate system... that's nonsense, and dangerous nonsense at that. It was that sort of blindness that hamstrung and eventually destroyed the League. Democracy should be defended because it does the jobs of the state best- protecting the rights that the society deems important (as well as helping the society to determine which rights it deems important... a more important question than it seems when you get into the question of human rights vs. property rights), defending the subjects (or citizenry) of the state, promoting economic growth, ensuring domestic tranquility and stability, and best reflecting the wishes of the society. This is why democracy can't be imposed, however, but must grow from the desires of the people themselves... because if they don't grant a democratic government legitimacy, Robert, it doesn't matter how much you rant: it isn't legitimate.
Thursday, July 11, 2002
Heh. Musil's response is up to my, um, fisking(?) of his post. It isn't exactly authoritative.
You forgot Rousseau, Robert, and I didn't even get into what ol' uncle Karl thought about the whole thing. What a fascinating non-response. If Musil can rebut Hobbes and Rousseau (who had opposed but equally valid critiques of his "self-evident truths") to any significant degree I will be greatly surprised.
When the response is this weak, I'm rather tempted to declare victory and go home.
...although at least one of his commenters may want to consider reading beyond Hobbes and Locke, maybe starting with the self evident truths of the Declaration of Independence.
You forgot Rousseau, Robert, and I didn't even get into what ol' uncle Karl thought about the whole thing. What a fascinating non-response. If Musil can rebut Hobbes and Rousseau (who had opposed but equally valid critiques of his "self-evident truths") to any significant degree I will be greatly surprised.
When the response is this weak, I'm rather tempted to declare victory and go home.
To continue with what I was talking about earlier, and to address Dean's objections in the comments section:
Sovereignty does exist. That isn't in question. What's in question, then, is how one sovereign body can influence another. There are, of course, ways of influencing governments to do what you wish. First, of course, is the threat of war, occupation, or outright slaughter; it isn't "just", but it can exist, and can work quite well. The problem, of course, is that using that style of bargaining ("war is diplomacy by other means") tends to lead to a lot of dead people and destroyed property on both sides and is usually best avoided. it can also lead to unexpected side effects, and the possibility exists that the aggressor can lose, in which case it becomes vulnerable itself.
The other, and often superior way, is to appeal to the government's own self-interests. This is where the concepts of international law, international treaties, international bodies and bilateral and multilateral agreements come into play. None of these are sovereign in-and-of themselves- they simply represent agreements between sovereign governments to play by the rules if they know that the other guys will too. This doesn't remove the government's sovereignty, it simply provides a guideline by which that government can best use its sovereignty to avoid prisoner's dilemmas, tragedies of the commons, arms races, and all the other problems that can affect or disrupt security and trade. This even extends to the UN... if a state is not a member of the UN and not a signatory to its treaties, then the UN has no authority over it, and it need not pay attention to a single word the UN says. This also includes less formalized agreements- the evolution of the current international system may have got its start at the Treaty of Westphalia, but it's largely informal. Nothing wrong with that- tradition can be even more powerful than law.
The problem, of course, comes up when somebody makes a deal and then breaks it. On a certain level a sovereign nation (such as the United States) is perfectly free to attack whomever it wishes, with the understanding that it is in return a target that can be attacked itself. However, most sovereign nations (including the United States) is beholden to a number of treaties and bodies that have set down ground rules by which it can operate, under the expectation that it can enjoy the knowledge that everybody else who is a signatory to the treaties (or whatever) is playing by the same rules. If somebody signs a treaty and then breaks it (or agrees to be involved in an international body and then ignores it), then the whole thing falls apart, because the expectation that everybody else has that you were going to play by the rules disappears, and they immediately ignore the rules as well; nobody likes a free rider, and nobody likes being a sucker.
(Yep, we're back to game theory again... free riders are those who enjoy the benefits of a collective action without having to be subject to the rules, and suckers are those who are subject to the rules but don't recieve the benefits. The one creates the other). In essence, this is why so many people get so (legitimately) pissed off at certain states (including, notoriously, the United States)- signing and breaking a deal pretty much ruins it for everybody, including (usually) the party that is breaking the deal.
So how does this enter into Iraq? Well, Iraq is part of the U.N., and is subject to the unwritten traditions that underlie the international system. The United States is part of the U.N. too. When Iraq breaks a deal (as it did when it invaded Kuwait) it opens itself up to retaliation: from Kuwait itself, its allies, and the members of the international bodies and treaties that it has agreed to be subject to (either explicitly or tacitly). The severity and nature of the deal-breaking action usually determines the reaction, of course- nobody is going to suggest invading Hong Kong, for example, because it plays merry hell with international copyright laws. They might sanction it, or cut off trade status, but they aren't going to invade. In the case of the Gulf War, though, Iraq had already invaded one country and was threatening others, the U.N. was expected to respond, and therefore authorized the action to liberate Kuwait from Iraq- both because Iraq had broken its deal, and not freeing Kuwait would break the deal the U.N. and other countries had with it.
(Incidently, this is also why the Gulf War wasn't "just about oil"- oil may have been the reason why it was prosecuted so quickly, but the U.N. and U.S. had perfect justification to do what they did.)
A similar justification existed for the invasion of Afghanistan- the government of Afghanistan (or at least an allied body) had directly attacked the United States and it threatened to do so again. The United States was perfectly justified in what it did- even if the U.N. hadn't approved it yet, there's no doubt that the U.N. (at the very least the Security Council) would have. (The taliban was not a member of the U.N., however, so it isn't quite so clear as it was in the case of Iraq.) It's important to note, however, that the attack had already taken place- anticipatory attacks are by-and-large not kosher- we'd end up with thousands of wars between governments that are hostile to one another and are absolutely convinced that the other guy is going to attack first and they're simply acting "in self-defense". (Or they'd simply use that as an excuse. Not that it would really matter, in the long run.)
Now, of course, it's a different story, because while Iraq is still breaking deals by not letting the inspectors in and (presumably) creating weapons of mass destruction, only one nation (the United States) is saying that this is grounds for invasion. More importantly, though, that nation isn't satisfied with simply ensuring that Iraq plays by the rules.. it wants to force regime change in order to further its own interests and security. (Which no state agreed to, and no state is likely to do so). If the United States invades, then all of a sudden its the deal-breaker- it's the free rider that is attempting to enjoy the benefits of international treaties and bodies without having to be constrained by their rules. Whether this is "just" or not is immaterial- it's a simple matter of contracts made and broken, and the United States will be breaking practically every contract it has made by doing so, and in so doing make those contracts meaningless. Without those contracts, of course, all you have is anarchy.
That is why the rest of the world is pissed. That is why the warbloggers who have been calling for invasion are apparently either completely unaware of how international law and international relations work, or have ceased to care because of the United States' power. That is why Europe is going absolutely batshit right now, because they place great value on these sorts of treaties and bodies. And that is why any invasion of Iraq is something that needs to be considered very carefully, and probably is the reason why George H.W. Bush didn't take out Saddam in the first place. Yes, the United States could invade Iraq. It's sovereign, it has that ability, and could probably go it alone if necessary. By doing, so, though, it risks tearing apart the foundations of the vast majority of the collective and bilateral security agreements and bodies that keep what is an incredibly anarchic system somewhat peaceable and orderly. It becomes a free rider, and the rest of the world will know that, and will know full well the implications of a hyperpower breaking practically every deal it has made.
(There is, of course, another way of creating order in an anarchic system. It's one that has become increasingly popular lately, and serious people are starting to advocate it, despite the problems that it has had in the past. It's a system where one government gains sovereignty over most of the rest, and ensures security through its own strength. You probably know that system. It's called Imperialism.)
Sovereignty does exist. That isn't in question. What's in question, then, is how one sovereign body can influence another. There are, of course, ways of influencing governments to do what you wish. First, of course, is the threat of war, occupation, or outright slaughter; it isn't "just", but it can exist, and can work quite well. The problem, of course, is that using that style of bargaining ("war is diplomacy by other means") tends to lead to a lot of dead people and destroyed property on both sides and is usually best avoided. it can also lead to unexpected side effects, and the possibility exists that the aggressor can lose, in which case it becomes vulnerable itself.
The other, and often superior way, is to appeal to the government's own self-interests. This is where the concepts of international law, international treaties, international bodies and bilateral and multilateral agreements come into play. None of these are sovereign in-and-of themselves- they simply represent agreements between sovereign governments to play by the rules if they know that the other guys will too. This doesn't remove the government's sovereignty, it simply provides a guideline by which that government can best use its sovereignty to avoid prisoner's dilemmas, tragedies of the commons, arms races, and all the other problems that can affect or disrupt security and trade. This even extends to the UN... if a state is not a member of the UN and not a signatory to its treaties, then the UN has no authority over it, and it need not pay attention to a single word the UN says. This also includes less formalized agreements- the evolution of the current international system may have got its start at the Treaty of Westphalia, but it's largely informal. Nothing wrong with that- tradition can be even more powerful than law.
The problem, of course, comes up when somebody makes a deal and then breaks it. On a certain level a sovereign nation (such as the United States) is perfectly free to attack whomever it wishes, with the understanding that it is in return a target that can be attacked itself. However, most sovereign nations (including the United States) is beholden to a number of treaties and bodies that have set down ground rules by which it can operate, under the expectation that it can enjoy the knowledge that everybody else who is a signatory to the treaties (or whatever) is playing by the same rules. If somebody signs a treaty and then breaks it (or agrees to be involved in an international body and then ignores it), then the whole thing falls apart, because the expectation that everybody else has that you were going to play by the rules disappears, and they immediately ignore the rules as well; nobody likes a free rider, and nobody likes being a sucker.
(Yep, we're back to game theory again... free riders are those who enjoy the benefits of a collective action without having to be subject to the rules, and suckers are those who are subject to the rules but don't recieve the benefits. The one creates the other). In essence, this is why so many people get so (legitimately) pissed off at certain states (including, notoriously, the United States)- signing and breaking a deal pretty much ruins it for everybody, including (usually) the party that is breaking the deal.
So how does this enter into Iraq? Well, Iraq is part of the U.N., and is subject to the unwritten traditions that underlie the international system. The United States is part of the U.N. too. When Iraq breaks a deal (as it did when it invaded Kuwait) it opens itself up to retaliation: from Kuwait itself, its allies, and the members of the international bodies and treaties that it has agreed to be subject to (either explicitly or tacitly). The severity and nature of the deal-breaking action usually determines the reaction, of course- nobody is going to suggest invading Hong Kong, for example, because it plays merry hell with international copyright laws. They might sanction it, or cut off trade status, but they aren't going to invade. In the case of the Gulf War, though, Iraq had already invaded one country and was threatening others, the U.N. was expected to respond, and therefore authorized the action to liberate Kuwait from Iraq- both because Iraq had broken its deal, and not freeing Kuwait would break the deal the U.N. and other countries had with it.
(Incidently, this is also why the Gulf War wasn't "just about oil"- oil may have been the reason why it was prosecuted so quickly, but the U.N. and U.S. had perfect justification to do what they did.)
A similar justification existed for the invasion of Afghanistan- the government of Afghanistan (or at least an allied body) had directly attacked the United States and it threatened to do so again. The United States was perfectly justified in what it did- even if the U.N. hadn't approved it yet, there's no doubt that the U.N. (at the very least the Security Council) would have. (The taliban was not a member of the U.N., however, so it isn't quite so clear as it was in the case of Iraq.) It's important to note, however, that the attack had already taken place- anticipatory attacks are by-and-large not kosher- we'd end up with thousands of wars between governments that are hostile to one another and are absolutely convinced that the other guy is going to attack first and they're simply acting "in self-defense". (Or they'd simply use that as an excuse. Not that it would really matter, in the long run.)
Now, of course, it's a different story, because while Iraq is still breaking deals by not letting the inspectors in and (presumably) creating weapons of mass destruction, only one nation (the United States) is saying that this is grounds for invasion. More importantly, though, that nation isn't satisfied with simply ensuring that Iraq plays by the rules.. it wants to force regime change in order to further its own interests and security. (Which no state agreed to, and no state is likely to do so). If the United States invades, then all of a sudden its the deal-breaker- it's the free rider that is attempting to enjoy the benefits of international treaties and bodies without having to be constrained by their rules. Whether this is "just" or not is immaterial- it's a simple matter of contracts made and broken, and the United States will be breaking practically every contract it has made by doing so, and in so doing make those contracts meaningless. Without those contracts, of course, all you have is anarchy.
That is why the rest of the world is pissed. That is why the warbloggers who have been calling for invasion are apparently either completely unaware of how international law and international relations work, or have ceased to care because of the United States' power. That is why Europe is going absolutely batshit right now, because they place great value on these sorts of treaties and bodies. And that is why any invasion of Iraq is something that needs to be considered very carefully, and probably is the reason why George H.W. Bush didn't take out Saddam in the first place. Yes, the United States could invade Iraq. It's sovereign, it has that ability, and could probably go it alone if necessary. By doing, so, though, it risks tearing apart the foundations of the vast majority of the collective and bilateral security agreements and bodies that keep what is an incredibly anarchic system somewhat peaceable and orderly. It becomes a free rider, and the rest of the world will know that, and will know full well the implications of a hyperpower breaking practically every deal it has made.
(There is, of course, another way of creating order in an anarchic system. It's one that has become increasingly popular lately, and serious people are starting to advocate it, despite the problems that it has had in the past. It's a system where one government gains sovereignty over most of the rest, and ensures security through its own strength. You probably know that system. It's called Imperialism.)
And now my comments are down. (Although oddly enough, the archive seems ok).
Now I've just got to try to figure out whether it's YACCS that's screwed up or my page. I'd ask for comments, but, well...
(Hope to fix this soon.)
Edit: Ok, scratch that. The comments work, just not in Mozilla/Netscape. This blows (to put it mildly) as I've become quite addicted to the convenience of tabbed browsing and the relative speed of the Gekko engine. Since my copy of Mozilla hasn't changed, I guess it's YACCS. Anybody else run across this problem and know a fix?
Now I've just got to try to figure out whether it's YACCS that's screwed up or my page. I'd ask for comments, but, well...
(Hope to fix this soon.)
Edit: Ok, scratch that. The comments work, just not in Mozilla/Netscape. This blows (to put it mildly) as I've become quite addicted to the convenience of tabbed browsing and the relative speed of the Gekko engine. Since my copy of Mozilla hasn't changed, I guess it's YACCS. Anybody else run across this problem and know a fix?
While my questioning of the basic notions that Robert built his argument on is already past, I should highlight a point he made in a followup to the other post:
Fine. How does one define the proper style of democracy? Is it American-style constitutionalism, British Parliamentarism, or something different? Should it be the sort of radical democracy that Anarchists tend to advocate, or a minarchist system that you tend to see argued for online? Are there term limits? Does the head of state have to be elected? Can a state religion exist, and if so which one? Can private property exist, and if it can should it be protected as a natural right outside the purview of the government, or just by the decisions of the electorate? (Rousseau, Hobbes, and Locke would have very different answers to this point.) And what about the tyranny of the majority? How do we account for it? And what about the socialists and communists who argue that the state is just a tool by one class to exploit another, and believe that democracy is pointless until the classless society comes to be?
More to the point, who gets to decide this, and why? And if you disagree with them, do they get to blow your head off, or do you get to blow their heads off? Or does it come down to who has the bigger guns? Not a recipe for a safe international community, especially if people take these questions deadly seriously. And, yes, they do.
That's why the quotation above is no falsehood- because there is no universal standard on what makes a good government, and nobody can stand from on high and decide "this is real democracy, and that is not". That's why the UN doesn't make the mistake that the League of Nations did (which people today forget) of only letting in governments that it likes. National sovereignty exists for a damned good reason, and as much as we'd like to reach out and change other governments into the kind we'd like, we can't do so and not leave ourselves open to being "adjusted" by others as well. Then, well, it just comes down to who shoots fastest.
One hears a false version of these principles from the UN and its apologists in the form of: "Every nation has the right to defend itself." No. Every democratic nation has a right to defend itself and be free of unwarranted outside force on the basis of its own legitimacy.
Fine. How does one define the proper style of democracy? Is it American-style constitutionalism, British Parliamentarism, or something different? Should it be the sort of radical democracy that Anarchists tend to advocate, or a minarchist system that you tend to see argued for online? Are there term limits? Does the head of state have to be elected? Can a state religion exist, and if so which one? Can private property exist, and if it can should it be protected as a natural right outside the purview of the government, or just by the decisions of the electorate? (Rousseau, Hobbes, and Locke would have very different answers to this point.) And what about the tyranny of the majority? How do we account for it? And what about the socialists and communists who argue that the state is just a tool by one class to exploit another, and believe that democracy is pointless until the classless society comes to be?
More to the point, who gets to decide this, and why? And if you disagree with them, do they get to blow your head off, or do you get to blow their heads off? Or does it come down to who has the bigger guns? Not a recipe for a safe international community, especially if people take these questions deadly seriously. And, yes, they do.
That's why the quotation above is no falsehood- because there is no universal standard on what makes a good government, and nobody can stand from on high and decide "this is real democracy, and that is not". That's why the UN doesn't make the mistake that the League of Nations did (which people today forget) of only letting in governments that it likes. National sovereignty exists for a damned good reason, and as much as we'd like to reach out and change other governments into the kind we'd like, we can't do so and not leave ourselves open to being "adjusted" by others as well. Then, well, it just comes down to who shoots fastest.
Matthew Yglesias and Robert Musil (the Man Without Qualities) have been having a discussion about why the international community should recognize illegitimate governments, which was kicked off by this post here. As it's short, I'll post the vast majority of it, and comment as I go:
Bolding mine, and for a good reason: although this is consistent with American conceptions of legitimacy, it does not and never has meant a hill of beans historically. Robert, put down the Federalist Papers and go read some Hobbes- legitimacy does not come from elections, it comes from the consent of the governed (the subjects) to obey the will of the government. If that consent is withdrawn, then (as John Locke pointed out) the alternative is armed revolution or (as Thomas Hobbes pointed out) leaving that country. Free and fair elections mean that it's more likely that the government is representative and reduces the likelihood of the necessity of armed regime change, but it doesn't eliminate it... that's the entire reason the second Amendment exists, and it's a pretty important concept in international relations. Indeed, free and fair elections don't necessarily have anything to do with important elements of modern states, or else how would the Queen of England gain her ceremonial (and very real, if only symbolic) power as the head of state of not just England, but a fair chunk of the commonwealth as well?
Hell, Rousseau and other critics of liberal democracy (including most Anarchists) would argue (and did argue) that "free and fair elections" are meaningless if certainly things aren't "up for grabs", a concept that formed the basis for Lockean liberal democracy. Rousseau famously said that "people in democracies are sovereign only on election day", and it's a sentiment that exists to this day.
And how can something be a "universal principle" when most of the world doesn't recognize it, recognizes the legitimacy of non-democratic governments and is willing to normalize relations with them? The United States is (notoriously) no exception to this rule. You can't arbitrarily declare that a principle is universal.. it has to be empirically demonstrable, and by no means is the Declaration any kind of empirical demonstration of the universality of the principles it sets out. It is the justification for rebellion by the Founders, yes, and important in that respect, but it doesn't mean a hill of beans outside of that nation's borders. They may hold these truths to be self-evident, but I doubt the British agreed at the time, and I doubt a lot of the planet would even now.
If by "anachronistic" you mean "traditionally the case", then yes, the concept of national sovereignty has been observed for (I believe) longer than the United States has been a country, and certainly longer than any of us have been alive. It recognizes what I just said above: that legitimacy does come from the people, but not from elections: it comes from their willingness to be subject to its authority. (This is true in the United States as well- the difference is that the final authority is the Constitution, not Congress. In other countries it's entirely different- in Britain, for example, it's the Queen and her Parliament that is supreme, and the constitution that is subject to the will of that Parliament.) If the people didn't obey the government, if they didn't agree to be subjects, then that government has no legitimacy. Period. End of story. Even if it slaughtered them all like hogs, it still wouldn't gain legitimacy, as what's a government without the governed, and how can you govern the dead?
(Besides, dictators can be popular and even beloved by their subjects. Unlikely, yes, but certainly possible. What if the general will was that they wanted the El Presidente to be dictator-for-life, and were willing to defend him against those who attempt to impose a democratic system? Is he not legitimate then?)
Again, the concept of "universal principles" is deeply problematic within the political sphere- precious little is universal, everything is up for debate, and assertions that any system is The One Best System are usually quickly and brutally shot down by those who point out the flaws of that system. (As I said earlier, this includes liberal democracy.)
In other words, governments that do not conform to these "universal" principles don't lose their legitimacy- their subject-derived legitimacy invalidates the universality of the principles. A distasteful notion, perhaps, but just try getting a few beers into an Anarchist and start hearing about how screwed up liberal democracy is. That's why national sovereignty is, in the end, so important: if countries tried to impose their vision of good government on everybody else, the world would never cease warring, and most people would, unfortunately, be too dead to argue.
It also seems an appropriate day to consider some principles which events of this day not really so many years ago helped to establish. One very odd aspect of international law is its failure to incorporate some basic eighteenth century political insights. For example, political thinkers of the eighteenth century (including the signers of the Declaration) recognized the universal principle that the only source of governmental legitimacy is the consent of the governed. And "consent of the governed" means frequent, free and fair elections - not some dictator telling the world that if an election were held he would win. And "consent of the governed" doesn't mean some dictator or oligarchy explaining that their country is not "ready" for full electoral democracy. These are universal democratic principles, not details subject to ad hoc consideration on the basis of cultural relativism. There is room, however, for various uneasy "virtual representation" theories which disenfranchise some classes of people (children, criminals and others), and for significant constitutional variations.
Bolding mine, and for a good reason: although this is consistent with American conceptions of legitimacy, it does not and never has meant a hill of beans historically. Robert, put down the Federalist Papers and go read some Hobbes- legitimacy does not come from elections, it comes from the consent of the governed (the subjects) to obey the will of the government. If that consent is withdrawn, then (as John Locke pointed out) the alternative is armed revolution or (as Thomas Hobbes pointed out) leaving that country. Free and fair elections mean that it's more likely that the government is representative and reduces the likelihood of the necessity of armed regime change, but it doesn't eliminate it... that's the entire reason the second Amendment exists, and it's a pretty important concept in international relations. Indeed, free and fair elections don't necessarily have anything to do with important elements of modern states, or else how would the Queen of England gain her ceremonial (and very real, if only symbolic) power as the head of state of not just England, but a fair chunk of the commonwealth as well?
Hell, Rousseau and other critics of liberal democracy (including most Anarchists) would argue (and did argue) that "free and fair elections" are meaningless if certainly things aren't "up for grabs", a concept that formed the basis for Lockean liberal democracy. Rousseau famously said that "people in democracies are sovereign only on election day", and it's a sentiment that exists to this day.
And how can something be a "universal principle" when most of the world doesn't recognize it, recognizes the legitimacy of non-democratic governments and is willing to normalize relations with them? The United States is (notoriously) no exception to this rule. You can't arbitrarily declare that a principle is universal.. it has to be empirically demonstrable, and by no means is the Declaration any kind of empirical demonstration of the universality of the principles it sets out. It is the justification for rebellion by the Founders, yes, and important in that respect, but it doesn't mean a hill of beans outside of that nation's borders. They may hold these truths to be self-evident, but I doubt the British agreed at the time, and I doubt a lot of the planet would even now.
But most forms of international law continue to inhabit some pre-Enlightenment sphere in which even a simple dictatorship can claim to be the legitimate government of a nation with rights to defend itself and the nation. This form of international law dominates the United Nations. And it is completely anacronistic and wrong.
If by "anachronistic" you mean "traditionally the case", then yes, the concept of national sovereignty has been observed for (I believe) longer than the United States has been a country, and certainly longer than any of us have been alive. It recognizes what I just said above: that legitimacy does come from the people, but not from elections: it comes from their willingness to be subject to its authority. (This is true in the United States as well- the difference is that the final authority is the Constitution, not Congress. In other countries it's entirely different- in Britain, for example, it's the Queen and her Parliament that is supreme, and the constitution that is subject to the will of that Parliament.) If the people didn't obey the government, if they didn't agree to be subjects, then that government has no legitimacy. Period. End of story. Even if it slaughtered them all like hogs, it still wouldn't gain legitimacy, as what's a government without the governed, and how can you govern the dead?
(Besides, dictators can be popular and even beloved by their subjects. Unlikely, yes, but certainly possible. What if the general will was that they wanted the El Presidente to be dictator-for-life, and were willing to defend him against those who attempt to impose a democratic system? Is he not legitimate then?)
One consequence of these universal principles - a consequence which is not openly vetted in what E.B. White called the little green glass shee-bang on the East River - is that all governments that do not conform to such principles are illegitimate.
Again, the concept of "universal principles" is deeply problematic within the political sphere- precious little is universal, everything is up for debate, and assertions that any system is The One Best System are usually quickly and brutally shot down by those who point out the flaws of that system. (As I said earlier, this includes liberal democracy.)
In other words, governments that do not conform to these "universal" principles don't lose their legitimacy- their subject-derived legitimacy invalidates the universality of the principles. A distasteful notion, perhaps, but just try getting a few beers into an Anarchist and start hearing about how screwed up liberal democracy is. That's why national sovereignty is, in the end, so important: if countries tried to impose their vision of good government on everybody else, the world would never cease warring, and most people would, unfortunately, be too dead to argue.
Wednesday, July 10, 2002
While interesting, this post by Joe Katzman makes me want to remind people that there are different parts of the Iranian government, and only a part of it (the clerics) is especially repressive. While I'd welcome the eclipsing of the clerics as much as anything else, an Iran collapsed into chaos is a much more dangerous Iran than an Iran where the reformist government took over the reigns completely and gave the clerics an "out" that everybody could accept. Sure, it would mean that those terrorist-backing bastards in the clergy get off scott-free, but sometimes regime stability, legitimacy, and strength are worth the price of vengeance.
Once again, I've noticed that "fisking" is seen by some as a complete rebuttal and debunking of someone's arguments. It isn't, of course; it's merely a debating style, and a ridiculously flawed one at that- it usually misses the forest for the trees, and almost always leads to back and forth ping-pong quotation. That isn't new.
What is new is that pretty transparent strawman or simply weak arguments are now getting the "fisking" label for some reason. Indeed, if anything this was an anti-fisk argument, because H.D. Miller managed to somehow write page after page of lengthy rebuttal to convenient points that have little or nothing to do with the argument at hand!
For those who didn't follow the link, he basically pulled out the old "Malthus was wrong before, so he must be perennially wrong forever" argument, which seems to imply that the Earth could support an infinite number of human beings. Ludicrous, yes, but especially when it has little or nothing to do with the material arguments actually being made by his target. What were those arguments? You've got me: this is the entirety of his quotation:
That's it. This is fisking? I mean, at least Julian Simon actually engaged Paul Ehrlich's arguments, even if his infamous "bet" probably had more to do with lucky economic timing than an actual lessening (?) of scarcity. Miller pulls off the Bush-esque tactic of answering questions that were never asked, and ignoring ones that actually are. Like Simon, he either forgets or ignores the simple truth that substitution only goes so far, and trying to extending current trends indefinitely would earn any stats student a vicious smack on the back of his head from the irate professor.
Whenever I read something like this, I too often thing "why am I even paying attention to this obvious tripe?" Then I remember that people believe it. And people link it. And therefore other people read it, and often haven't the faintest idea that there might even be a debate on the subject, let alone that arguments like Miller's are of questionable worth.
What is new is that pretty transparent strawman or simply weak arguments are now getting the "fisking" label for some reason. Indeed, if anything this was an anti-fisk argument, because H.D. Miller managed to somehow write page after page of lengthy rebuttal to convenient points that have little or nothing to do with the argument at hand!
For those who didn't follow the link, he basically pulled out the old "Malthus was wrong before, so he must be perennially wrong forever" argument, which seems to imply that the Earth could support an infinite number of human beings. Ludicrous, yes, but especially when it has little or nothing to do with the material arguments actually being made by his target. What were those arguments? You've got me: this is the entirety of his quotation:
A study by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), to be released on Tuesday, warns that the human race is plundering the planet at a pace that outstrips its capacity to support life. In a damning condemnation of Western society's high consumption levels, it adds that the extra planets (the equivalent size of Earth) will be required by the year 2050 as existing resources are exhausted.
That's it. This is fisking? I mean, at least Julian Simon actually engaged Paul Ehrlich's arguments, even if his infamous "bet" probably had more to do with lucky economic timing than an actual lessening (?) of scarcity. Miller pulls off the Bush-esque tactic of answering questions that were never asked, and ignoring ones that actually are. Like Simon, he either forgets or ignores the simple truth that substitution only goes so far, and trying to extending current trends indefinitely would earn any stats student a vicious smack on the back of his head from the irate professor.
Whenever I read something like this, I too often thing "why am I even paying attention to this obvious tripe?" Then I remember that people believe it. And people link it. And therefore other people read it, and often haven't the faintest idea that there might even be a debate on the subject, let alone that arguments like Miller's are of questionable worth.
Oh, and lest I forget, that last piece was courtesy of Instapundit, except that at least Jonah didn't Godwin himself. Little by little, it seems like Instapundit is becoming a parody of himself.
Ok, stripped from all the verbiage, what I've been abled to discern from Jonah Goldberg's latest piece on Stanley's Fish's defense of PoMo is that he believes:
a) Ideas are dangerous
b) Post-Modernism is a dangerous idea that has spread everywhere
and...
c) Stanley Fish should be blamed not for what he says or believes, but what other people think- that the simplistic misconceptions about Post-Modernism that people may hold are not their own fault, but the fault of those who actually try to explain what PoMo really is.
Whatever the hell happened to the "individual responsibility" meme in conservatism? It seems that conservatives start embracing otherwise-repugnant "root cause" arguments the minute they get within fifty feet of a University. Professors wish they had that kind of power. Even if this wasn't absurd (Fish should be held responsible for trying to correct other people's misconceptions and for those misconceptions in the first place) it's incredibly off-message.
Edit: Ugh. "Goldman" instead of "Goldberg". Noted and corrected. Oddly enough, I have to give the credit to Glenn Reynolds for that, and I didn't picture him to be a regular reader. What's next, Glenn hanging out at Maxspeak and Eschaton?
a) Ideas are dangerous
b) Post-Modernism is a dangerous idea that has spread everywhere
and...
c) Stanley Fish should be blamed not for what he says or believes, but what other people think- that the simplistic misconceptions about Post-Modernism that people may hold are not their own fault, but the fault of those who actually try to explain what PoMo really is.
Whatever the hell happened to the "individual responsibility" meme in conservatism? It seems that conservatives start embracing otherwise-repugnant "root cause" arguments the minute they get within fifty feet of a University. Professors wish they had that kind of power. Even if this wasn't absurd (Fish should be held responsible for trying to correct other people's misconceptions and for those misconceptions in the first place) it's incredibly off-message.
Edit: Ugh. "Goldman" instead of "Goldberg". Noted and corrected. Oddly enough, I have to give the credit to Glenn Reynolds for that, and I didn't picture him to be a regular reader. What's next, Glenn hanging out at Maxspeak and Eschaton?
Oliver Willis adroitly and succinctly answers the Kaus alarmism about the newly emergent and assertive liberalism:
For eight years we heard about "Bubba" and how he and Hillary had supposedly killed dozens of people, Rush Limbaugh offered daily nightmare scenarios of how liberalism was destroying our great nation (and continues to this day through outfits like the GOP mouth-organ Washington Times) - but now that the right is in power we shouldn't give as good as we got? Bulls**t.I could quote everybody else tearing him a new asshole, but I think Oliver summed it up more than well enough. It's always a pity (as a liberal) to watch a liberal turn to conservatism; it's even more so to watch that same shift render someone seemingly incapable of rational thought. Kaus has gone from interesting to alarming to simply somewhat embarassing.
Namby-pambyism died with a 5-4 vote.
Tuesday, July 09, 2002
Some of those long comments threads make me wonder if I should start a message board like Judah's.
Speaking of Judah, what's going on with his site? Hasn't posted in a while, and I'm really missing it.
Speaking of Judah, what's going on with his site? Hasn't posted in a while, and I'm really missing it.
A comments post made me think of something from Ender's Game (and other books) that both ties into the "Pax Americana" and the missile defense issue, as well as the standard problem of U.S. unilateralism. I had always based my critiques of missile defense on the idea that it doesn't work; that the technology we currently have is insufficient for the job, which may be physically impossible anyway. Here's an interesting question, though:
What if it does work?
I don't just mean works pretty good, I mean works according to the wildest dreams of Reagan; a shield that pretty much renders nuclear weapons utterly pointless, as it can be used on the coasts for cruise missiles and sub missiles and in space (or ground-launched, whatever) for ballistic missiles. And let's say that Bush passes the technology around like he said he would or (more likely) it gets leaked by some DoD folks who get astonishingly rich and move to Morocco. Nukes have become passe- fighting, if it is to be done, is to be done by manned weaponry because missiles simply don't work anymore. There might be in-theatre weapons, but you have to get there first, and Metal Gear style gun-fired nukes are not an issue. (As an aside, if something like Metal Gear Ray ever was created...)
This would not, of course, be a recipe for peace. It would be a recipe for war. A lot of war, actually, because all of a sudden all those fabulous military toys that are still pretty much obsolete thanks to the threat of nukes when reasonably big two powers go toe-to-toe become usable again. All of a sudden the world becomes a much more dangerous place, because the apocalyptic threat that serves as a check to ambition disappears and wars for conquest, for vengeance, or simply because a quasi-fascist government is really bored and wants something to do become perfectly acceptable. Money starts pouring into military R&D again, because all of a sudden those nukes that provided the last line of defense don't mean squat any more, and the only thing between, say, Russia and conquest is the strength of their force of arms.
Europe would suddenly become a much more dangerous place to live, and Asia even more so. Even the United States wouldn't necessarily be invulnerable, although it would be a world where the United States could act as a spoiler in any conflict you'd care to name; unless the world actually did become bipolar and the United States was placed up against a foe that could conceivably defeat it. I mean really defeat it: as I said, without nukes, the only thing between the United States and its enemies is the traditional tools of air, sea, and land- tools that aren't nearly as reliable a deterrent as the threat of apocalypse. In turn (and probably because of this) the United States could become a much more belligerent power, because that hanging threat in the back of American minds could turn Bush-style unilateralism into the pacifistic side of the American military discourse. The argument for empire would be a lot stronger, perhaps even unassailable. America's opponents and even allies would know this too.
There would probably be other repercussions too; those are just the ones that are at the top of my head. (What would a world where world conquest is conceivably possible be like?)
Right now, of course, it's very unlikely that Bush's vision of limited NMD would create anything even remotely like that. Still, like in the last entry, it's useful to think long-term, and long-term it's conceivably possible that nukes will by-and-large be relatively unimportant. If it happened to coincide with the growth of an anti-American opposition that I mentioned in the last post...
Well, let me put it this way. The Outback would look very, very tempting. Mate.
It is said that there are two kinds of true statements. There are those whose opposites are false (such as "the sky is blue" vs. "the sky is not blue"), and those are the normal truths. Then there are the great truths, where opposite statements are both true (such as "love sucks" vs. "love is great". Both are true, and yet contradict each other).
I was struck by this when I read an article in the Washington post, liked by Alterman, that brought up the old question "why don't we listen anymore?" This article (like many others) points out that around the world people who were once reliably pro-American are becoming increasingly suspicious of, if not hostile to, the growing amount of American unilateralism. The classic response to this is "the United States can do what it wishes; it has the right to do so and the responsibility to do so". This is true, but it doesn't negate the previous statement. It is perhaps one of those Great Truths; that while the United States either should or must behave as its own requirements and beliefs demand (as many have argued, including Steven Den Beste in the article I referenced earlier), it is also perhaps inevitable that this will alienate its allies and further enrage its enemies (if not creating new ones.) Sometimes good and necessary actions have repercussions and negative reactions from those who are also acting in their own best interests, and who honestly believe that they are in the right. This doesn't necessarily have anything to do with the War on Terrorism; conflicts like those over the ICC and Kyoto seem to pivot on these fundamental differences in perspectives, interests, and conceptions of the good. (Going back partially to that "government as public good" vs. "government as necessary evil" division that seperates the United States from the rest of the first world.)
This, of course, is the center of what I think of as the "polarized world" thesis; that the rest of the world will start opposing the hegemonic power whether tacitly or openly as that power works to secure its own interests and the interests of those who are not part of that power become more and more opposed to that power. In terms of economics this wouldn't seem to make sense, but nobody sensible believes in the sort of economics-uber-alles arguments that infested the public discourse during the latter part of the 20th century; and relative national and strategic power (as opposed to economic power) is largely a zero-sum game.
Where is this going? I'm not sure, honestly. It's pretty obvious that Europe is going to start growing closer together and away from the United States at this point with or without the conflict between the United States and Islam, and Asia's not going to be as strategically friendly with the United States as some would like: the article's references of concerns over China are a good example:
This isn't about whether the United States is wrong or right in its actions, but how the rest of the world will react to them, and it seems to be increasingly likely that there will be friction if not outright fracture between the United States and the rest of the world, region by region. Even if the actions of the United States are totally justifiable and logical, that may end up being entirely meaningless if those totally justifiable and logical positions alienate a good portion of the globe.
Then again, no country can really afford to set itself against the United States, not with its huge economy and (arguably) even more impressive military. Even entire regions probably couldn't deal with the military and economic might of the United States. Everybody knows this, and I don't see it changing soon unless the corporate fallout becomes a heck of a lot worse than it already is and Japan and Europe become economic powerhouses. (Or China takes its rightful place as a key economic player; its internal economy alone could be staggering in fifty years). However, economics change much faster than diplomatic attitudes do, and the seperation of the interests of the United States and other regions around the globe isn't likely to reverse any time soon.
When the United States finally deals with the threat of militant Islam (or is consumed by it, although this is vanishingly unlikely), it may look up to see a world very different than the one it left behind in the 1990's. Even if every act it takes is a good and wise one, it may be the victim of one of those Great Truths: in doing what is in its best interests, it could simultaneously break down the international trust and respect it depends on at the same time. I don't expect the long rule of a Pax Americana.
Edit: Ugh. "Article Article".
I was struck by this when I read an article in the Washington post, liked by Alterman, that brought up the old question "why don't we listen anymore?" This article (like many others) points out that around the world people who were once reliably pro-American are becoming increasingly suspicious of, if not hostile to, the growing amount of American unilateralism. The classic response to this is "the United States can do what it wishes; it has the right to do so and the responsibility to do so". This is true, but it doesn't negate the previous statement. It is perhaps one of those Great Truths; that while the United States either should or must behave as its own requirements and beliefs demand (as many have argued, including Steven Den Beste in the article I referenced earlier), it is also perhaps inevitable that this will alienate its allies and further enrage its enemies (if not creating new ones.) Sometimes good and necessary actions have repercussions and negative reactions from those who are also acting in their own best interests, and who honestly believe that they are in the right. This doesn't necessarily have anything to do with the War on Terrorism; conflicts like those over the ICC and Kyoto seem to pivot on these fundamental differences in perspectives, interests, and conceptions of the good. (Going back partially to that "government as public good" vs. "government as necessary evil" division that seperates the United States from the rest of the first world.)
This, of course, is the center of what I think of as the "polarized world" thesis; that the rest of the world will start opposing the hegemonic power whether tacitly or openly as that power works to secure its own interests and the interests of those who are not part of that power become more and more opposed to that power. In terms of economics this wouldn't seem to make sense, but nobody sensible believes in the sort of economics-uber-alles arguments that infested the public discourse during the latter part of the 20th century; and relative national and strategic power (as opposed to economic power) is largely a zero-sum game.
Where is this going? I'm not sure, honestly. It's pretty obvious that Europe is going to start growing closer together and away from the United States at this point with or without the conflict between the United States and Islam, and Asia's not going to be as strategically friendly with the United States as some would like: the article's references of concerns over China are a good example:
In Seoul, American hostility toward North Korea is seen to be undermining President Kim Dae Jung's efforts to engage the North. Several top South Korean leaders emphasized to me that Washington either doesn't understand or doesn't care that South Korea cannot afford to take over a collapsing North Korea. "How can we make Washington understand that we need a long transition and that we must prevent, not precipitate, a sudden collapse of the North?" asked a key Korean negotiator.
In China there is widespread disappointment and resentment over the recent U.S. designation of China as a "strategic competitor rather than a strategic partner" as well as over the president's declaration that America "will do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan. Both are seen as needlessly hostile... As for Taiwan, no one I met in Asia believed there is any danger of invasion...The only circumstance most observers can imagine that could provoke an attack would be a declaration of independence by Taiwan, something that, ironically, recent U.S. policies are seen to be encouraging.
This isn't about whether the United States is wrong or right in its actions, but how the rest of the world will react to them, and it seems to be increasingly likely that there will be friction if not outright fracture between the United States and the rest of the world, region by region. Even if the actions of the United States are totally justifiable and logical, that may end up being entirely meaningless if those totally justifiable and logical positions alienate a good portion of the globe.
Then again, no country can really afford to set itself against the United States, not with its huge economy and (arguably) even more impressive military. Even entire regions probably couldn't deal with the military and economic might of the United States. Everybody knows this, and I don't see it changing soon unless the corporate fallout becomes a heck of a lot worse than it already is and Japan and Europe become economic powerhouses. (Or China takes its rightful place as a key economic player; its internal economy alone could be staggering in fifty years). However, economics change much faster than diplomatic attitudes do, and the seperation of the interests of the United States and other regions around the globe isn't likely to reverse any time soon.
When the United States finally deals with the threat of militant Islam (or is consumed by it, although this is vanishingly unlikely), it may look up to see a world very different than the one it left behind in the 1990's. Even if every act it takes is a good and wise one, it may be the victim of one of those Great Truths: in doing what is in its best interests, it could simultaneously break down the international trust and respect it depends on at the same time. I don't expect the long rule of a Pax Americana.
Edit: Ugh. "Article Article".
Monday, July 08, 2002
Oh, and while I'm here, this springs to mind as a useful example of the new right-wing spin:
Now, as most people who actually know anything about the issue and aren't playing spin doctor could tell you, the SEC was very clear to point out that the issue was not settled and that Bush was not exonerated; they just weren't persuing it at the present time. The right seems to be taking this as an admission of innocence on the part of Bush, however, and that just goes to show that any claim they have as to a superior grasp of the facts and a more honest attitude towards politics and politicians is simply yet more spin.
Once again, however, they're deliberately obfuscating the real issue. The real issue is not to show that Bush pulled off some neat insider trading (which he almost certainly did) and that "technical violations" are not necessarily minor ones (especially in the case of securities fraud, where it's all about "technicalities); the real issue is that he was both beneficiary of and party to the same sort of fraudulent and unethical practices that are bringing down huge corporations and (lest we forget) costing thousands of people their jobs completely out of nowhere.
Then again, anybody who spouts this:
...probably doesn't deserve to be taken seriously, considering that all that "dishonestly, corruption and vileness" was pretty much made out of whole cloth by the same people who are desperately defending Bush now. That's the difference, Mr. DiBenedetto: the former assertions were nonsense, whereas this investigation is based on fully documented evidence of the sort that the Republicans would have killed for four years ago. The Republicans had to catch Clinton in a perjury trap in order to get their party-line impeachment off the ground, whereas all the Democrats have to do is do a little digging into the "MBA president's" business dealings. The sad part is that it doesn't look like Bush's exploits are anything special; they're just par for the course.
And, of course, the whole reason anybody even knows this guy exists is because, yes, Instapundit linked to him. Just in case anybody had forgotten about the ol' Echo Chamber and Instapundit's big publicity gong.
This, even though the matter was investigated and no charges were filed by the SEC. While Bush's actions may have been technical violations, they were not uncommon, and were generally considered "fairly trivial" by the SEC.
Now, as most people who actually know anything about the issue and aren't playing spin doctor could tell you, the SEC was very clear to point out that the issue was not settled and that Bush was not exonerated; they just weren't persuing it at the present time. The right seems to be taking this as an admission of innocence on the part of Bush, however, and that just goes to show that any claim they have as to a superior grasp of the facts and a more honest attitude towards politics and politicians is simply yet more spin.
Once again, however, they're deliberately obfuscating the real issue. The real issue is not to show that Bush pulled off some neat insider trading (which he almost certainly did) and that "technical violations" are not necessarily minor ones (especially in the case of securities fraud, where it's all about "technicalities); the real issue is that he was both beneficiary of and party to the same sort of fraudulent and unethical practices that are bringing down huge corporations and (lest we forget) costing thousands of people their jobs completely out of nowhere.
Then again, anybody who spouts this:
This, of course, forgets that they spent the eight years of the former Narcissist-in-Chief's administration defending every kind of dishonesty, corruption and vileness, and at the same time claiming a moral high ground; that such incessant investigations were wrong, and harmful to the country.
...probably doesn't deserve to be taken seriously, considering that all that "dishonestly, corruption and vileness" was pretty much made out of whole cloth by the same people who are desperately defending Bush now. That's the difference, Mr. DiBenedetto: the former assertions were nonsense, whereas this investigation is based on fully documented evidence of the sort that the Republicans would have killed for four years ago. The Republicans had to catch Clinton in a perjury trap in order to get their party-line impeachment off the ground, whereas all the Democrats have to do is do a little digging into the "MBA president's" business dealings. The sad part is that it doesn't look like Bush's exploits are anything special; they're just par for the course.
And, of course, the whole reason anybody even knows this guy exists is because, yes, Instapundit linked to him. Just in case anybody had forgotten about the ol' Echo Chamber and Instapundit's big publicity gong.
Every time I think that maybe there's a little growth of appreciation for non-conservatarian views online, I run across something like this:
We know. Bush is evil. Corporations are evil. Energy companies are doubly evil.
How about: Krugman is simpleminded, petty, and obsessed. That makes sense to me.
Or how about "Krugman has been highlighting pretty glaring problems in the current administration, current economic climate, and in the past of 'the MBA president', George W. Bush"? I mean, "simpleminded"? This is a new one; even Jane Galt and the rest of the Krugman watchers don't make that assertion. Honestly, does this guy even know who Krugman is? Or maybe "considering that the stock market is getting beaten like a bad monkey thanks to the sorts of corporate fraud that Bush himself was tied to and which he is expected to clean up, this sort of story is profoundly important"?
(I mean, who honestly can say something like "corporations are evil" sarcastically nowadays and still think they can get away with it?)
In any case, I get the feeling that if Blogs were popular during the Clinton administration, the constant attack columns that infested the right-wing press over far more trivial matters would get a pass. It's not about the criticism, it's that Krugman is criticizing their guy. If Krugman wants to spend every column attacking the administration (which he hasn't; the piece from last week about the little games that corporations play to inflate their earnings mentioned Bush only parenthetically), then that's his right. If the criticism needs to be made, then that's his responsibility. If it prompts more substantial investigation, then that's to his credit. Judging by the controversy swirling around Bush thanks to that column, I'd say that Krugman said what needed to be said.
Is there the slightest possibility that Paul Krugman will write something other than a flat-out hit piece on the President? By my count, 17 of his last 18 columns have been precisely that, including today's.
We know. Bush is evil. Corporations are evil. Energy companies are doubly evil.
How about: Krugman is simpleminded, petty, and obsessed. That makes sense to me.
Or how about "Krugman has been highlighting pretty glaring problems in the current administration, current economic climate, and in the past of 'the MBA president', George W. Bush"? I mean, "simpleminded"? This is a new one; even Jane Galt and the rest of the Krugman watchers don't make that assertion. Honestly, does this guy even know who Krugman is? Or maybe "considering that the stock market is getting beaten like a bad monkey thanks to the sorts of corporate fraud that Bush himself was tied to and which he is expected to clean up, this sort of story is profoundly important"?
(I mean, who honestly can say something like "corporations are evil" sarcastically nowadays and still think they can get away with it?)
In any case, I get the feeling that if Blogs were popular during the Clinton administration, the constant attack columns that infested the right-wing press over far more trivial matters would get a pass. It's not about the criticism, it's that Krugman is criticizing their guy. If Krugman wants to spend every column attacking the administration (which he hasn't; the piece from last week about the little games that corporations play to inflate their earnings mentioned Bush only parenthetically), then that's his right. If the criticism needs to be made, then that's his responsibility. If it prompts more substantial investigation, then that's to his credit. Judging by the controversy swirling around Bush thanks to that column, I'd say that Krugman said what needed to be said.
I have no intention of turning this into some sort of Den Beste watchblog, but honestly, Steven, what the hell is this?
This is the textual equivalent of saying "look out behind you!" and running off when you get in trouble. Other then the fantastically unproven assertions involved in that last sentence, it shows that the "perfect is the enemy of the good" email that prompted this entry still permeates his blog in general and that he seems to feel the need to pull it out whenever he gets contradicted. He's still saying the equivalent of "nothing can work, we shouldn't even bother" even as he denies it, and attempts to misdirect criticism of that stance. Vaara still had a point.
This also enters into the rest of the entry, which talks about vouchers, school choice, and the (seemingly non-controversial) idea that some kids are just naturally kind of dim. Which is true, so far as it goes, but what is in question (and which goes begging in Den Beste's entry) is why this happens to be the case, and whether someone can do anything about it. Those kids who are "just plain stupid" could have ended up there because their education happened to be somewhat substandard, or because they have a specific learning disability that, when overcome, would show that they are actually pretty damned bright. (One of my best friends is dyslexic, which up until very recently would be classed as "a dim kid". She's brilliant.)
This is, in fact, the main argument against school vouchers that has always made sense to me... public schools are a "default" version, and private schools can exclude problem students, so private schools are going to be able to leave the public schools with the problem kids, reap the rewards of higher test scores and the increased enrolment that that provides, all while public schools have their funding removed and in a desperate attempt to rectify what cannot be rectified start cutting special education courses. Then, of course, my brilliant friend is called an idiot because she doesn't read the same way everybody else does, thinks she's an idiot because she hasn't the faintest clue that her problem is dyslexia, and "shuts off her brain", so to speak, because the assumption breeds the reality.
Does this mean that Den Beste doesn't have a point about the difference in potential between different students? No, of course some students are going to be smarter than others. Unless he can pull out much better evidence as to why this happens to be the case and why we're helpless to do anything about it (which seems to be a common thread in his entries- a curious attitude for someone who admires engineering so much), I'm not buying that it's a justification for school vouchers or anything much at all, in fact.
Like the unspoken yet still obvious assertion that governmental intransigence is so ingrained and unstoppable in Africa that we should just let them all die, the idea that we can't do anything for the dumb kids is one which is most assuredly not self-evident.
(For instance, in Vaara's perfect universe, education programs in Africa can actually convince the people there to stop engaging in sexual behaviors which are at risk for spreading HIV. In the real world, on the other hand, such programs aren't practical because of other issues like wars and revolutions and incompetent governments.)
This is the textual equivalent of saying "look out behind you!" and running off when you get in trouble. Other then the fantastically unproven assertions involved in that last sentence, it shows that the "perfect is the enemy of the good" email that prompted this entry still permeates his blog in general and that he seems to feel the need to pull it out whenever he gets contradicted. He's still saying the equivalent of "nothing can work, we shouldn't even bother" even as he denies it, and attempts to misdirect criticism of that stance. Vaara still had a point.
This also enters into the rest of the entry, which talks about vouchers, school choice, and the (seemingly non-controversial) idea that some kids are just naturally kind of dim. Which is true, so far as it goes, but what is in question (and which goes begging in Den Beste's entry) is why this happens to be the case, and whether someone can do anything about it. Those kids who are "just plain stupid" could have ended up there because their education happened to be somewhat substandard, or because they have a specific learning disability that, when overcome, would show that they are actually pretty damned bright. (One of my best friends is dyslexic, which up until very recently would be classed as "a dim kid". She's brilliant.)
This is, in fact, the main argument against school vouchers that has always made sense to me... public schools are a "default" version, and private schools can exclude problem students, so private schools are going to be able to leave the public schools with the problem kids, reap the rewards of higher test scores and the increased enrolment that that provides, all while public schools have their funding removed and in a desperate attempt to rectify what cannot be rectified start cutting special education courses. Then, of course, my brilliant friend is called an idiot because she doesn't read the same way everybody else does, thinks she's an idiot because she hasn't the faintest clue that her problem is dyslexia, and "shuts off her brain", so to speak, because the assumption breeds the reality.
Does this mean that Den Beste doesn't have a point about the difference in potential between different students? No, of course some students are going to be smarter than others. Unless he can pull out much better evidence as to why this happens to be the case and why we're helpless to do anything about it (which seems to be a common thread in his entries- a curious attitude for someone who admires engineering so much), I'm not buying that it's a justification for school vouchers or anything much at all, in fact.
Like the unspoken yet still obvious assertion that governmental intransigence is so ingrained and unstoppable in Africa that we should just let them all die, the idea that we can't do anything for the dumb kids is one which is most assuredly not self-evident.
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